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A B S T R A C T
The O n to log ica l A rg u m e n t fo r  the  ex is tence  o f God is b r ie f ly  examined 
w ith  p a r t ic u la r  re fe re n ce  to  its  basic prem ise , th e  assum ption o f the  
p e rfe c tio n  o f God. D espite  some problem s w ith  th e  idea, i t  is be lieved 
th a t  p e rfe c tio n  is a v a lid  concept. The  th ru s t  o f th e  a r t ic le  is th a t i f  a 
p e rfe c t God e x is ts ,  such p e rfe c tio n  re q u ire s  a t least th e  basic  concepts 
o f th e  d o c tr in e  o f the  T r in i t y .  The a u th o r th e re fo re  be lieves th a t  the  idea 
o f th e  T r in i t y  is d e riva b le  in a ru d im e n ta ry  fo rm  w ith o u t re fe re n ce  to  
e ith e r  re v e la tio n  o r to  the  "v e s tig ia "  ( th e  supposed re fle c tio n  o f the  
T r in i t y  in th e  c re a tio n ) ,  b u t s im ply  from  th e  idea o f p e rfe c tio n . Some 
a u th o rs , b o th  m edieval and modern are c ite d  in s u p p o rt o f th e  a rgum ent.
1. IN TR O D U C TIO N
In o u r  m odern p ragm atic  w orld  th e  d o c trin e  o f th e  T r in i t y  is regarded  
as a s u p e rflu o u s  piece of m um bo-jum bo, incom prehens ib le  and unneces­
s a ry  to  th e  modern w o rld  (M oltm ann, 1981:1; W elch, 1953:3 f e tc ) .  I t  
w ould  be inconce ivab le  th a t any serious heated a rg u m e n t a bout such 
" ir re le v a n c ie s ” , as b roke  ou t in the  fo u r th  c e n tu ry ,  cou ld  s e rio u s ly  take  
place to d a y . I t  has l i t t le  s ig n ifica n ce  fo r  th e  lives  o f most in d iv id u a l 
C h r is tia n s , who are in p ra c tice  m onothe istic  (R a h n e r, 1970:10). T h is  is 
p a r t ic u la r ly  due to  th e  rise  o f h is to ric a l c r it ic is m  w h ich  a ttached  the  
re v e la to ry  basis o f the  d o c trin e  especia lly  in th e  Gospel o f John , and
due to  th e  in flu e n ce  of Schle ierm acher (W elch, 1953:3 ).
Koers 53(2)1988 , Q.,_
N everthe less th e  d o c trin e  deserves p rom inence. Despite seeming 
irre le v a n c e , i t  d id  g row  o u t o f th e  C h ris tia n  experience  of God (Fortm an, 
1982:x i i i ) .  T hus in to d ay 's  C harism atic experie n ce s , w here th e re  is a 
d a n g e r o f fa llin g  in to  e r ro r  o f a T r in ita r ia n  n a tu re , th e re  is a need to  
be c le a r conce rn ing  o u r d o c trin e  o f th e  Godhead. I am th in k in g  here, 
f o r  exam ple, o f such ideas as b e liev in g  th a t we are in th e  age of the  
S p ir i t  ( c f .  M ontanus o r Sabellius) o r  o f us ing  th e  name of Jesus as a 
"ta lism a n " to  e x tra c t fa v o u rs  from  God. Both o f these are fa ir ly  common 
in some c irc le s . Welch (1953:227) rem arks on th e  va rious U n ita rian ism s, 
c e n te rin g  on d if fe re n t  persons o f th e  T r in i t y  w hich  have occu rre d  in 
h is to ry .
The  idea of God's p e rfe c tio n  is also not acceptable in to day 's  c u ltu re , 
due to  the  e vo lu tio n a ry  p h ilosophy w hich  pervades much of modern 
th o u g h t.  E v e ry th in g  is perce ived  o f as in a s ta te  o f change, so th a t the  
notion  o f an absolute in any sphere  is not reg a rd e d  as tenab le , ra th e r, 
all is viewed as re la tiv e  to  something else.
W hether these tw o may be connected in th e  l ig h t  o f to d ay 's  c u ltu re , more 
than  ju s t  in opposition  to  pragm atism , is a m a tte r th a t deserves some 
c o n s id e ra tio n . What I w ant to  d iscuss is th a t th e y  do have a connection, 
so th a t  th e  idea o f th e  p e rfe c tio n  o f God w ill lead n a tu ra lly  to  the  essence 
o f th e  d o c trin e  o f the  T r in i t y .
1.1 THE D ER IVATIO N  OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE T R IN IT Y
T he  d o c tr in e  o f th e  T r in i t y  is not to  be fo u n d  e x p lic it ly  in S c r ip tu re , 
b u t is ra th e r  a theolog ica l a ttem pt to  reconcile  w hat would seem to be its 
c o n tra d ic to ry  statem ents concern ing  God th e  F a th e r, th e  Son and the  
H oly S p ir i t .  H is to ric a lly  th e  classical fo rm u la tio n  came as a re s u lt o f 
p ro lo n g e d  theo log ica l c o n tro v e rs y , v e ry  much a ffe c te d  b y  p o litica l p re s ­
s u re s , d u r in g  th e  f i r s t  fo u r  c e n tu rie s . T h is  cannot be viewed as to ta lly  
s a tis fa c to ry , p a r t ic u la r ly  as the  then  c u r re n t  ph ilosophy a ffec ted  the  
fo rm u la tio n , and th is  p h ilosophy is no lo n g er held as v a lid  in the  modern 
w o r ld . T hus B ru n n e r does not g ive  th e  d o c tr in e  the  prom inence th a t
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B a rth  accords i t  (c f .  Fortm an, 1982:263). T h is  is because th e  T r in i t y  
belongs to  th e o lo g y , not the  kerygm a, so it  is se co n da ry , not an imme­
d ia te  u tte ra n c e  o f fa ith  b u t a com bination o f such (W elch, 1953:66, 159).
N e ve rth e le ss , re v e la tio n , as recorded in S c r ip tu re , is to  be view ed as 
th e  roo t o f th e  d o c tr in e . Perhaps an e a rly  h in t th a t  even a t an e a rly  
stage th is  was no t viewed as s a tis fa c to ry  is th a t A u g u s tin e , in his w ork  
de T r in ita te  used th e  concept of th e  re fle c tio n  o f th e  C re a to r in th e  apex 
o f th e  c re a tio n , man, to  illu s tra te  th e  d o c tr in e , and to  make it  more 
com prehens ib le . T h is  approach con tinued  to  be p o p u la r in th e  M iddle 
A ges, w h e re , fo r  example, Anselm p re fe rre d  th e  ana logy o f s p r in g , 
stream  and lake (B a rth , 1975:336). From th is  comes th e  idea o f a "second 
ro o t” o f th e  d o c trin e  in the  th re e -in -o n e n e s s  so fre q u e n t in c rea tion  
(B a r th ,  1975:333 f), as well as in man h im self.
Such ideas are  not po p u la r w ith  modern man. A f te r  a le n g th y  d iscu ss ion , 
B a rth  re je c ts  th e  v a lid ity  o f any second roo t fo r  th e  d o c tr in e , a lthough  
th is  conclus ion  is not accepted by  a ll.
What I w an t to  do is to  suggest a th i r d  roo t, taken  not from  c re a tio n , 
b u t fro m  th e  v e ry  conception of God. ( I t  is v e ry  s a t is fa c to ry , as w ill 
be seen, fo r  " th re e "  to  crop  up so so o n !) T h is  is o f cou rse  s im ila r to  
th e  O nto log ica l A rgum ent where Anselm , and o th e rs , a rg u e  from  the  
conception  o f God to  show He must e x is t; I w an t to  go a stage fu r th e r  
and say th a t He m ust e x is t as T r in i t y .
2. THE O N TO LO G IC AL ARGUMENT
I t  is ob v io us  th a t w he ther God e x is ts  is a su b je c t o f ex trem e im portance, 
s im p ly  because o f his n a tu re . A p e rso n ’s b e lie f in G od's ex is tence  o r 
n o n -e x is te n ce  w ill in e v ita b ly  a ffe c t his e n tire  a tt itu d e  to  life .  So fa r -  
rea ch in g  is th is  be lie f th a t Pascal, in his famous w a g e r, was p repared  
to  s take  all upon God's ex is tence even w ith o u t adequate  p ro o f. For th is  
reason th e re  have been many a ttem pts to  p ro ve  th e  e x is te nce  o f God, 
a lth ou g h  not one o f them has enjoyed a n y th in g  a p p ro a ch in g  a consensus
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of app rova l conce rn ing  its  v a lid ity .  Some have fa re d  more successfu lly  
than  o th e rs , b u t in e ve ry  case co u n te r argum ents have been p resen ted , 
also o f course o f d o u b tfu l v a lid ity ,  b u t enough to  ren d e r each argum ent 
non -com pelling . Indeed, p ro o f of God's ex is tence  has been considered 
im possib le, both as tie d  up w ith  the  v a lid ity  o f any form  of na tu ra l 
reve la tion  (B a r th ) ,  b u t perhaps more im p o rta n tly , due to  a notion th a t 
i f  God could be p ro v e d , the  p roo f would be in some way g re a te r than 
God, w h ich  would be w rong  (c f .  Kon ig , 1982:138). N evertheless the  
"p ro o fs "  may indeed be v a lid , and do o f course have cum ula tive  e ffe c t. 
(A lth o u g h , as has been said, th re e  times n o th in g  is s t i l l  n o th in g !)  They 
also have a va lu e , once God’s ex is tence has been accepted, in re la tin g  
som ething of his a ttr ib u te s .
O f these "p ro o fs "  th e  O nto logica l A rgum en t is u n ique , in so fa r  as i t  
a ttem pts to  dem onstrate God's ex is tence a p r io r i ,  so w ith o u t any reference 
to  th e  crea ted  o rd e r ,  b u t sim ply from  the  idea o f God. Because o f its  
un iqueness, i t  has occasioned an enormous volume o f l ite ra tu re , some of 
w h ich  is o f an e x trem e ly  technica l n a tu re .
The A rg u m e n t its e lf goes back to  Anselm , w ho, accord ing  to  P lantinga 
(1968 :ix )  a c tu a lly  produced  two a rgum en ts , a lthough  Plantinga suggests 
th a t Anselm  may not have realized th is .  W hether such a d is tin c tio n  re a lly  
ex is ts  is , how ever, a moot p o in t.
2.1 THE V A L ID IT Y  OF THE ARGUMENT
The f i r s t  ve rs io n  o f the  A rgum ent s ta rts  from  th e  premise th a t God is 
the  suprem e b e in g , th e  g re a te s t possib le , "a be ing  than  w hich n o th ing  
g re a te r can be conce ived" (A n se lm ). Now w ha t is th e  g re a te s t conceivable 
m ust e x is t,  he a rgues, as w hat e x is ts  is g re a te r  than  th a t w hich does 
no t. Descartes took th is  a b it  fu r th e r  by  a rg u in g  th a t ex is tence its e lf 
is a p e rfe c tio n , so th a t  i f  God is p e rfe c t, he m ust e x is t (P la n tin g a , 
1968:ix f ) .  I t  is th is  fo rm  o f th e  a rgum ent w h ich  was a ttacked  by  Kant 
(P la n tin g a , 1968: x i i ) ,  who po in ted  ou t th a t o u r conceptions o f th in g s  th a t 
e x is t, and th in g s  w hich  do not e x is t are id e n tic a l, so th a t ex is tence is
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not a p re d ic a te . Existence th e re fo re  adds n o th in g  to  o u r  co n ce p tio n . My 
comment here  is th a t th is  is g e n era lly  so, b u t Anselm  d id  no t s ta te  th a t 
i t  was necessary to  a c tu a lly  conceive o f w hat God is lik e , b u t o n ly  th a t 
God is th e  g re a te s t th a t can be conceived o f a t a ll (S o n tag , 1962:40). 
(T h e  g re a te s t conception possible is o f course  G od's own idea (B a r th ,  
1960:29), w h ich  b rin g s  a nice c ir c u la r ity  to  th e  a rg u m e n t.)  O thers  
(P la n tin g a , 1968: x i i)  have po in ted o u t th a t God is p ro ve d  in th is  a rg u ­
m ent e s s e n tia lly  b y  d e fin it io n , so th a t b y  d e fin in g  God as p e rfe c t,  one 
"p ro v e s "  his ex is te nce . T h is  is a p o in t to  w h ich  I m ust r e tu rn .
The  second ve rs io n  makes a d is tin c tio n  between tw o  k in d s  o f e x is tence , 
in the  m ind and in re a lity .  Now whereas a n y th in g  can e x is t  in th e  m ind, 
its  d e fin it io n  may be such th a t its  ex is tence  in re a lity  is ren d e re d  im­
poss ib le . The  c lassic  example o f th is  is th e  square  c irc le ;  i t  is q u ite  
possib le  to  d e fin e  i t  in  the  m ind, b u t b y  so do in g  its  real ex is tence  is 
p re c lu d e d . The opposite  idea applies to  God. By d e fin in g  w ha t is meant 
by  God, his n o n -ex is tence  becomes im possib le. Here again th e  d e fin it io n  
inc ludes th e  idea o f God as a p e rfe c t be ing  (P la n tin g a , 1968: x v i i ) .
D iscussion on the  A rgum ent has p roduced  a v a r ie ty  o f co n c lu s io n s . These 
range from  th e  a ttem pt of F ind lay (P la n tin g a , 1968: l l l f )  to  p roduce  a 
s im ila r a rg u m e n t w hich  w ill p rove  God's n o n -e x is te n ce  (on th e  g ro u n d s  
th a t God sh o u ld , by  d e fin it io n , be inescapable ; since He is ig n o re d , He 
can not e x is t ) ,  to  the  acceptance b y  such as H a rts h o rn e  and Malcolm 
(P la n tin g a , 1968). Barnes (1972:80), dea ling  w ith  th e  a rg u m e n t from  the 
view  o f log ic  w r ite s :
T hu s  I conclude th a t Anselm 's ve rs ion  o f th e  O n to log ica l A rg u m e n t 
is not p ro b a tiv e . I t  is , I th in k ,  a v a lid  a rg u m e n t; I have not shown 
th a t  its  prem ises contain  fa ls ity .  B u t th e re  is no reason to  accept 
i t  as a p ro o f o f the ism , since th e re  is no reason to  be lieve  a p re ­
su p p o s itio n  o f its  f i r s t  p rem iss, namely th e  p ro p o s itio n  th a t  th e re  
is ju s t  one th in g  than  which n o th in g  g re a te r  can be im agined.
Barnes is sa y in g  here  th a t if  th e  prem ise is a ccep ted , th e n  th e  ex is tence  
o f God fo llo w s . He does not f in d  p ro o f fo r  th is  prem ise (a lth o u g h  he may 
in fa c t be lieve  i t ) ,  b u t c e rta in ly  cannot d is p ro v e  i t  e ith e r .  Spinoza
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(E th ics  Pt. 2 de f. 6) is saying the  same th in g :  "B y  re a lity  and pe rfec tion  
I u n d ers ta n d  the  same th in g " .
2 .2  THE PERFECTION OF GOD
The b e lie f th a t God is necessarily  p e rfe c t is a ca rd in a l fe a tu re  of Greek 
th e o lo g y  and as such has in fluenced  theo log ica l th o u g h t to  the  p re se n t. 
T h u s , fo r  example:
[God i s ] . . . th e  be ing w hich its e lf is p e rfe c tio n  and so the  standard  
o f a ll p e rfe c tio n s  (B a r th , 1957:322).
A b s o lu te ly  f r e e . . . f r o m  all im perfections (B e rk h o f,  1958:57).
G reek th e o lo g y  d id  have problems w ith  the  B ib lica l p e rsp e c tive , seeing 
such re fe rences as to  the  repentance o f God as incom patib le w ith  God's 
p e rfe c tio n . H ow ever, i t  is recognized th a t change (e .g . in repentance) 
need not s ig n ify  im pe rfe c tio n , b u t is in fa c t necessary i f  God is to  be 
fa ith fu l in changing  c ircum stances, w h ich  is th e  essence of im m u ta b ility . 
The  B ib le  does p re se n t God as p e rfe c t, b u t not as the  G reek conception. 
Examples in the  Old Testam ent are D eut. 3 2 :4 , Job 37:16, 2 Sam. 22:31, 
Ps. 19 :7 , w here  the  emphasis fa lls  not on th e  n a tu re  of God him self b u t 
upon w ha t He does. A s im ila r v ie w p o in t is fo u n d  in th e  New Testam ent 
eg. M att. 5 :48. The idea of "g re a te r  than  a ll"  is the  closest in the  B ible 
to  th e  notion o f p e rfe c tio n , so e xc lu d in g  th e  idea o f the  absolute th a t 
belongs to  G reek theo logy.
More c o n s is te n t w ith  the  B ib lica l p ic tu re  is , how ever, th a t God, ra th e r 
th a n  be ing  p e rfe c t, w hich pu ts  him on a leve l w ith  c rea tio n , is "incom ­
pa ra b le " (K o n ig , 1982:20 who cites such te x ts  as Is . 4 0 :18 ). N e ve rth e ­
less, unless we use analogy to  some degree , we cannot say a n y th in g  at 
a ll about God.
More to  th e  p o in t is th a t,  p a r t ic u la r ly  in a moral sense, any idea of 
"p e r fe c t io n "  th a t we have is d e rive d  from  God. T h is  w ill have the  e ffe c t
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o f re d u c in g  th e  O nto log ica l a rgum ent to  a ta u to lo g y : God is d e fined  as 
p e rfe c t, and w hat is p e rfe c t is c o n fo rm ity  to  God.
H ow ever, the  ta u to lo g y  is not complete. We have a conception  o f p e r ­
fe c tio n , w h ich  its e lf  is d e rive d  from  God. T h is  is not to  say th a t o u r 
conception  its e lf  is c o rre c t, b u t the  v e ry  fa c t th a t we do th in k  th a t 
som ething is p e rfe c t does suggest an e n t ity  causing  th a t conception  (as 
th e  fe e lin g  o f h u n g e r suggests the  ex is tence  o f fo o d ). I t  is w o rth  no ting  
here th a t Anselm  be lieved God is p e rfe c t by  re v e la tio n . The idea fo rced  
its e lf  on him (B a rth , 1960:76).
Such an u n d e rs ta n d in g  of p e rfe c tio n  is incom patib le  w ith  a n o th e r set o f 
ideas w h ich  w ould  re n d e r the  O nto log ica l a rg u m e n t unw o rka b le  due to  the  
c ru m b lin g  of its  prem ise. These are the  notions th a t God is not in fa c t 
p e rfe c t. (T h e  immediate problem  is then  the  m easurem ent o f the  s tandard  
o f p e r fe c t io n .)
The  issue th e re fo re  is not so much w h e th e r th e  O nto log ica l A rgum ent 
fo llow s v a lid ly  from  its  prem ise, b u t w h e th e r th e  prem ise its e lf  is c o rre c t. 
T h is  was s e lf-e v id e n t fo r  Anselm, b u t is cha llenged today  from  a num ber 
o f p e rs p e c tiv e s .
F ir s t ly ,  is th e re  such a th in g  as pe rfe c tio n ?  Such th in g s  as leng th  would 
appear to  be in f in ite ly  extendab le ; no abso lu te  is possib le  b u t o n ly  a 
measure o f r e la t iv i ty .  Secondly, even i f  th e re  is a p e rfe c t,  is God 
p e rfe c t, o r  is He ra th e r to  be seen as less th a n  th e  ideal? T h ir d ly ,  is 
i t  possib le  to  compare e v e ry th in g , so as to  say th a t one th in g  is more 
p e rfe c t than  a n y th in g  else?
I t  is c le a r th a t in some cases p e rfe c tio n  does e x is t ,  fo r  example a p e rfe c t 
square  is q u ite  poss ib le . I t  is in o th e r ca tegories  th a t th e re  is a prob lem , 
such as le n g th , w here  something cou ld  always be added to  " th e  g re a te s t 
c o n ce iva b le ". H ow ever, even in such ca te go rie s , the  concept o f " in f in ite "  
is p oss ib le  and is used in m athem atics. We have no em p irica l ev idence th a t 
such e x is ts ; indeed by  the  n a tu re  o f the  case an in f in ite  cannot be e x ­
p e rie n ce d , b u t it  is a p e rfe c tly  [s ic ]  va lid  co ncept.
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S econd ly, the  idea o f God as p e rfe c t is also a ttacked  in the  process 
th e o lo g y  of A .N . Whitehead and C. H a rtsh o rn e . God is viewed as 
d e ve lo p in g ,a n d  does th is  by e xperienc ing  re a lity ,  so could not be th o u g h t 
o f as p e rfe c t in the  absolute sense. ( In te re s t in g ly  H a rtsh o rn e  sees some 
v a lid ity  in the  O nto logica l A rg u m e n t.)
T h is  is not the  same as Pannenberg's o rie n ta tio n  o f God to  the  fu tu re ,  
w h ich  is not concerned so much w ith  the  be ing o f God, b u t the  knowledge 
th a t we have o f Him. He is p e rfe c t, b u t we w ill not know w hat th is  
p e rfe c tio n  enta ils  u n til the  eschatos. T h is  p o in t also answers both the  
accusation of ta u to lo g y  above and also a f re q u e n t c r itic is m  o f Anselm. 
To a sse rt th a t God is p e rfe c t does not im ply  an assertion  o f w hat th is  
means in de ta il ( "g re a te r  than can be c o n c e iv e d "); b u t is a q u a lita tiv e  
ra th e r  than a q u a n tita tiv e  assessment.
H ere, how ever, the  issue is not w h e th e r God is a t an abso lute  s ta te .
I t  is not necessary to  say th a t God is at th e  p innacle  o f any possible 
p e rfe c tio n , b u t th a t,  a t any tim e, He is the  most p e rfe c t. He would always 
seek to  be p e rfe c t accord ing  to  his conception  o f such, as He would 
change to  f i l l  any perce ived lack.
T h ir d ly ,  w hat is meant by  "p e rfe c tio n "  depends v e ry  much on the  p e r­
sp e c tive  o f the  v ie w e r. I t  is one th in g  to  assess tw o pieces o f m ach ine ry , 
b u t e n t ire ly  a no the r to  assess tw o w orks o f a r t .  To combine the  tw o , 
how could i t  p o ss ib ly  be assessed w hich o f tw o o therw ise  m echanically 
id e n tica l cars ( i f  th a t were possib le) o f d if fe re n t  co lours was more p e r­
fect?  O r, to  face a no the r choice, on w hat basis can tw o d if fe re n t  th in g s , 
such as a ca r and a kangaroo, be compared? One is more p e rfe c t fo r  
one p u rp o se , th e  o th e r fo r  ano ther (as i f  "p u rp o s e "  alone w ere th e  on ly  
c r i te r io n ) .  T he re  can be no abso lu te . S u re ly , how ever, as Anselm ’s 
re p ly  to  G aunilo im plies, God is so g re a t th a t  w ha tever com parison is 
made, God is the  most p e rfe c t. D iffe re n t p e rsp e c tive s  are p oss ib le , b u t 
in each, God is the  most p e rfe c t. T hus i t  is no t necessary to  speak of 
an abso lu te , b u t th a t God is always b e tte r ,  in any ca te go ry .
These ob jections b as ica lly  amount to  an u n d e rs ta n d in g  of th e  im portance 
o f the  o b s e rv e r, and a denial o f th e  idea o f an abso lu te . N e ith e r m ate­
r ia l ly  a ffe c ts  the  v a lid ity  of the  A rg u m e n t; in th e  f i r s t  case, God is seen
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as g re a te s t from  any p e rs p e c tiv e , w hich o n ly  serves to  enhance Him, and 
in th e  second case, Anselm q u ite  r ig h t ly  spoke o f th e  "g re a te s t con ­
ce iv a b le ", and not an abso lu te , fo r  w hich  th e  a rgum en t is v a lid .
Konig (1982:193) also re fe rs  to  th e  re jec tion  o f God as A lm ig h ty  (and 
hence as p e rfe c t)  fo r  the  sake o f human freedom . T h is  ob jec tion  is sim ­
i la r ly  d e a lt w ith , because to  say th a t God is p e rfe c t ly  m ig h ty  (q u a lity )  
does no t nece ssarily  mean th a t He has to  use th a t pow er ( q u a n t ity ) .
What th e  O nto log ica l A rgum en t d id  fo r  Anselm , because he spoke from  
th e  s ta n d p o in t o f fa i th ,  was to  sharpen his conception  o f God as p e rfe c t, 
and as a necessary b e in g . H ick (1973:76 f) seeks to  make a d is tin c tio n  
at th is  p o in t between tw o ideas o f ne ce ss ity , th a t  o f log ica l n e ce ss ity , 
w h ich  is seen in the  f i r s t  aspect o f Anselm 's a rgum en t (b u t  not the  
second) and exem plified  in D escartes, w hich since Kant is un ten a b le , and 
th a t o f fa c tu a l nece ss ity . (T he  p o in t here is th a t log ic can deal w ith  
h y p o th e tic a l m a tte rs , from  w hich o th e r w ill nece ssarily  fo llo w , w ith o u t 
any basis in real e x is te n c e .)  H ick p re fe rs  to  tre a t  th e  e x is tence  o f God 
in th is  second sense. "He ju s t is " (H ic k , 1973:89). H ow ever, he also 
says (1973 :88 ):
T h a t God is , is not one fa c t amongst o th e rs , b u t is re la ted  asym ­
m e tr ic a lly  to  all o th e r  fa c ts  as th a t w hich  determ ines them .
H ow ever, i f  God does e x is t as the  o r ig in  o f th in g s  th a t a re , p e rfe c tio n  
m ust be, almost b y  d e f in it io n , c o n fo rm ity  to  God. Here again we have 
th e  ta u to lo g y : w ha t is p e rfe c t m ust be God, and th e  idea o f p e rfe c tio n  
necessita tes th e  ex is tence  o f God. What is more re le v a n t to  th is  d iscussion  
is the  fu r th e r  c o ro lla ry  o f the  n a tu re  o f th is  p e rfe c t God.
To say th a t God is a necessary be ing does not s im ply say th a t He is , 
b u t m ust in c lu de  how He is , so i t  should be possib le  to  see th e  T r in i t y  
in th e  idea o f p e rfe c tio n  w hich  comes d ire c t ly  from  th e  idea o f necessary 
e x is te nce . T hus we take  o u r notion o f p e rfe c tio n , w hich  is d e riv e d  d i ­
re c tly  from  God as the  d e te rm ina tion  o f a ll, to  deduce w hat God is lik e .
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2 .3  THE COROLLARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Descartes developed his form  o f the  A rg u m e n t fo r  w hat would seem the 
obv ious reason, to  convince him self o f the  ex is tence  of God. Anselm, on 
th e  o th e r hand, had a d if fe re n t p u rpose . Since he p resented his argum ent 
as an address to  God, i t  would seem th a t he was a lready convinced. In ­
deed, his position  as A rch b ish op  w ould s u p p o rt th is .  His argum ent was 
then  ra th e r an attem pt to  u n d ers ta n d , and th u s  to  be more jo y fu lly  sa t­
is fie d  (B a r th , 1960:20). He perce ived  God as e x is tin g  necessarily  because 
He is p e rfe c t, and th u s  God is more w o r th y  o f p ra ise  than an e n tity  who 
does not e x is t necessarily .
I w ant to  suggest th a t i f  the  a rgum ent is indeed v a lid , then it  indicates 
also th a t God exis ts  as a T r in i t y ,  and so is more w o rth y  o f pra ise than 
a simple monad. The prem ise o f the  O nto log ica l A rgum en t is the  pe rfec tion  
o f God. I f  th is  is v a lid , it  not o n ly  leads to  a p ro o f o f the  existence of 
G od, b u t th a t such a God is a T r in i t y .
T h is  to  me is s ig n ific a n t, as one o f the  d raw backs o f the  tra d itio n a l a r ­
gum ents is th a t th e y  do not "p ro v e "  th e  k in d  o f God th a t C h r is tia n ity  
p roc la im s. T here  is a d iffe re n c e , as Pascal com pla ined, between the  God 
o f th e  B ib le  and the  god o f th e  p h ilo so p h e rs .
3 . ATTEMPTS TO DERIVE THE T R IN IT Y  W ITHO UT REVELATION
T h e re  have been some attem pts to  su ggest th a t  God is T r in i t y  sim ply from  
th e  n a tu re  of God. T here  are those o f H ugh and R ichard  o f S t. V ic to r ,  
and o f B onaventure .
H ugh saw the  essence o f the  T r in i t y  in re la tio n  (c f .  A u g u s tin e ). For him 
th e  T r in i t y  comprises the  to ta li ty  o f re la tio n s h ip s : "F o r th e re  is one who 
is from  no-one, and one who is from  him , and one who is from  both and 
w ith  b o th , so th e re  is T r i n i t y . . . . "  N everthe less  he d e rives  the  d o c trin e
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from  re v e la tio n , b u t says it  is th u s  in accordance w ith  reason (Fortm an, 
1982:189).
R ichard  goes a step fu r th e r .  D enying the  o p in ions o f o th e rs  th a t the  
T r in i t y  is a s t r ic t  m y s te ry , he feels th a t i t  can be ra tio n a lly  demon­
s tra te d , a lth ou g h  not from  reason alone. Fortm an (1982:193) says o f him:
a d iv in e  person m ust have supreme c h a r ity ,  and i t  cannot have th is  
fo r  a c rea ted  person . Hence th e re  m ust be in God a p lu ra l i ty  of 
d iv in e  p e rsons. M ust th e re  be o n ly  two? T h e re  m ust be a th ird .
For " in  m utual love th e re  is no th in g  ra re r ,  n o th in g  more e xce llen t, 
than  th a t you w ish a no the r to  be equa lly  loved b y  him whom love 
suprem ely  and by  whom you are loved supre m e ly ” (de T r in .  111:11).
In de T r in .  V : 11, R ichard  seeks to  lim it the  persons to  th re e  ( " fo r  o th ­
e rw ise  th e re  w ould be ir ra t io n a lly  an in f in ite  processional 
s e r ie s " ) . Fortm an (1982:194) comments, " I t  m ust be ra th e r  obvious th a t 
R ich a rd 's  ana lys is  of c h a r ity  does not re s u lt in an u rg e n t p ro o f o f the  
presence o f th re e  and o n ly  th re e  persons in G od".
What is , h ow ever, s ig n ific a n t in R ichard  is th a t he d e rive s  th e  T r in i t y  
from  th e  idea o f the  A bso lu te  ( lo ve , b e a titu d e , pow er) in God (F ra n k s , 
1953:133). A th ird  person o n ly  is needed to  complete th e  b lessing  o f the  
m utua l love o f th e  tw o . ( Is  th is  an a rgum ent fo r  po lygam y?) (R ich a rd  
can also be seen as a fo re ru n n e r  o f th e  Social T r in i t y  o f Hodgson, a l­
th o u g h  Hodgson makes no refe rence  to  h im .)
I t  is B o n a ve n tu re  who most fu l ly  developed th is  idea, again from  a 
p re s u p p o s itio n  o f p e rfe c tio n . He a rgues:
In God th e re  m ust be 'b e a titu d e , p e rfe c tio n , s im p lic ity , 
p r im a c y . . . .  I f  th e re  is supreme b e a titu d e , then  suprem e co ncord , 
suprem e g e rm a n ity  and suprem e c h a r ity .  B u t i f  th e re  w ere more 
than  th re e  persons th e re  w ould not be suprem e g e rm a n ity , i f  less 
not suprem e c h a r ity ' ( in  Sent. 1, d .2 ,  a . l ,  q .4 ) .  I f  th e re  is 's u ­
prem e p e rfe c tio n  then  the  p ro d u c in g  person  produces p e rfe c tly  
bo th  as reg a rd s  th e  mode of p ro d u c in g  and th e  one p ro d u ce d . B u t 
th e re  are o n ly  tw o noble modes o f p ro d u c in g , fo r  e v e ry  agent e ith e r
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acts by  way o f n a tu re  o r by  way o f w ill (A r is to t le ,  1.42 Phys.
1 1 .6 ) . . . .  And the person p roduced by  e ith e r  o f these two ways 
is most p e rfe c t. B u t if  e v e ry th in g  beyond p e rfe c tio n  is superfluous 
and e v e ry th in g  less than p e rfe c tio n  hs d e fe c tiv e , i t  is necessary 
th a t th e re  • can be o n ly  tw o emanating p e rs o n s .. .  and one from  
whom th e y  emanate and th e re fo re  o n ly  th re e  persons' ( ib id . )  
(Fortm an, 1982:213).
M ost, how ever, have seen no in h e re n t reason fo r  th e  T r in i t y .  The g rea t 
A u g u s tin e , d esp ite  his a ttem pt to  see ve s tig ia  in the  most lik e ly  place, 
th a t is , in man, the  apex o f c rea tion  (G en. 1 :2 7 ), can be c r itic iz e d  fo r  
in general m aking th e  S p ir it  less than  persona l, "e t ideo non amplius quam 
t r ia  s u n t; unus d ilige n s  eum qu i de illo  e s t, e t unus d iligens eum de quo 
e s t, est ipsa d ile c to " (A u g u s tin e , de T r in ita te  V I 7 -"a n d  th e re fo re  th e re  
are not more than  th re e , One who loves Him who is from  Him, One who 
loves Him from  whom he is , and th e  love its e lf " )  (H odgson, 1943:152). 
(Hodgson denies th a t the  ideas o f procession and sp ira tio n  are in fa c t 
re a lly  a p a rt o f the  T r in ita r ia n  d o c tr in e .)  A u g u s tin e  th u s  presents the  
S p ir i t  as the  m utual love between Father and Son, so a re la tio n sh ip , and 
a lthough  he does see " re la tio n "  as all th a t d is tin g u is h e s  the  persons, 
re a lly  fin d s  h im self more at home w ith  a B in ity .  Hodgson (1943:153), 
how ever, urges th a t he does seek to  m aintain th e  fu l l  p e rso n a lity  o f the  
S p ir i t .
Indeed the  o ffic ia l C atho lic  v ie w p o in t is now th a t th e  d o c trin e  is a m ys­
te r y ,  so th a t i t  is o n ly  accessible b y  means o f reve la tio n , by  fa ith  
(F o rtm an , 1982:289), so th a t reason cannot even dem onstrate i t  a fte r 
re v e la tio n , a lthough i t  can p ro g re ss  to  some u n d e rs ta n d in g . Aquinas, 
a lth ou g h  he be lieved th a t the  ex is tence  of God is dem onstrable by reason, 
d id  no t feel th e  same about th e  T r in i t y  (H odgson, 1943:24). Klein puts 
th e  o ff ic ia l p o s itio n : the  T r in i t y  is an abso lute  m y s te ry , so not demon­
s tra b le , not d isce rn ib le  no r can an adequate idea of i t  be formed by 
reason; neverthe less reason can achieve a v e ry  usefu l u n d ers ta n d in g , 
and a u x il ia ry  conceptions, indeed can p e n e tra te  i t  in d e fin ite ly  (Welch, 
1953:105).
From a v e ry  d iv e rg e n t v ie w p o in t, the  same th in g  is said by Barth  
(1975:312):
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. . .  reve la tio n  is the  basis of the  d o c trin e  o f th e  T r in i t y ;  the 
d o c tr in e  o f th e  T r in i ty  has no o th e r basis than  th is .
He sees a n a tu ra l co-equal th re e -fo ld e d n e ss  in th e  v e ry  concept o f re v ­
e la tio n , so d e riv e s  the  T r in i t y  sim ply from  th e  concept o f th e  revea ling  
God, th e re fo re  pu ts  i t  a t the  head o f his dogm atic system  (B a rth , 
1975:295 f, 334).
Welch (1953), s u rv e y in g  th e  d o c trin e  o f th e  T r in i t y ,  m entions a num ber 
o f th in k e rs  who have sought to  in v e s tig a te  the  d o c tr in e  o u ts id e  o f the  
re v e la tio n  c o n te x t. In p a r t ic u la r ,  Hegel, d e r iv in g  th e  T r in i t y  s im ply from  
reason, appealed to  the  idea of S p ir i t  as e te rn a lly  s e lf -d if fe re n t ia t in g  and 
resu m in g , "d is re m p tin g "  and re c o n c ilin g . God, as p u re  th o u g h t req u ire s  
an o b je c t o f th a t th o u g h t, o r an O th e r. N everthe less Hegel th u s  appears 
to  co n fuse  genera tion  and crea tion  (a f re q u e n t d i f f ic u l t y  in the  E arly  
C h u rc h ) and to  have a d e fic ie n t C h ris to lo g y  (o fte n  a te s t o f an adequate 
T r in ita r ia n is m )  in th a t on ly  C h r is t  pe rce ived  th e  u n ity  o f God and men 
(W elch, 1953: I l f ) .
More re c e n tly  H a rtsh o rn e  has seen th re e  basic elements in God: re fle x iv e  
tra n sce n d e n ce , abso lute  p e rfe c tio n  (u n s u rp a s s a b ility )  and re la tiv e  p e r ­
fe c tio n  (s u rp a s s a b ility )  (W elch, 1953:77). T h o rn to n  fee ls  th a t reason 
co n firm s  (n o t p roduces) the  d o c tr in e , fo r  i f  c rea tio n  alone is the  ob ject 
o f G od's love , God is not e te rn a l. He re jects  a m oda lis tic  idea o f God, 
seeing in th e  m u lt ip lic ity  o f God no b a r r ie r  to  His u n ity ,  as long as God 
is p e r fe c t ,  as i t  is im perfec tion  w hich  p roduces in d iv id u a lis m  (W elch, 
1 9 5 3 :8 0 f). Sayers sees the  T r in i t y  in a r t is t ic  p ro d u c tio n  ( id e a , a c t iv ity ,  
p o w e r) (W elch, 1953:86).
In th e s e , e spec ia lly  in Hegel and Sayers, a re fle c tio n  o f A u g u s tin e  is 
c le a rly  v is ib le . Welch rem arks a p p os ite ly  th a t a ll cannot be r ig h t .  M aking 
p a r t ic u la r  re fe re n ce  to  T h o rn to n  and Sayers, he notes th e  to ta lly  d i f ­
fe re n t  re s u lts  (T h o rn to n  req u ire s  persons, Sayers a s in g le  person o n ly  
(W elch, 1 9 5 3 :9 2 )). He rem arks also:
I f  is s ig n ific a n t th a t we are unable to  c ite  from  co n tem p o ra ry  l i t ­
e ra tu re  any n o te w o rth y  example o f a p u re ly  ph ilosoph ica l
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t r in ita r ia n is m , th a t is any a rgum ent fo r  th e  t r in ita r ia n  na ture  of 
God w hich  claims to  be independent o f reve la tion  (W elch, 1953:90).
Perhaps T il l ic h 's  a ttem pt is c losest. He does s ta r t  from  a premise o f the  
p e rfe c tio n  o f God, b u t a ttem pts to  re la te  all th e  doc trin e s  o f God to  the 
s tru c tu re  of being its e lf ,  w h ich  fo r  him emerges n a tu ra lly  in a T r in ita r ia n  
fo rm . T hus he sees a 3 -fo ld  expression o f B e ing , Existence and L ife , 
o r  o f In f in ite ,  F in ite  and th e  u n ity  o f th e  tw o , etc (Fortm an, 1982:267). 
H ow ever, he does u rge  th a t i t  is d o u b tfu l i f  we can speak m ean ing fu lly  
o f th e  ex is tence  o f God, fo r  th a t would p u t God in to  human categories 
o f u n d e rs ta n d in g  (H ic k , 1973:75), and hence lim it Him. God's "e x is t ­
ence” , th e re fo re , m ust be more p e rfe c t than  o u rs ; the  T r in i ty  must be 
b y  n a tu re  inconce ivab le ; by  saying  th is  he is , how ever, in line  w ith  
Anselm 's a rgum ent.
4 . THE PERFECTION OF GOD IMPLIES T R IN IT Y
What is s ig n ific a n t in these va rio u s  argum ents is how prom inent the  idea 
o f p e rfe c tio n  in God is , b u t as an a u x ilia ry  concept to  the  d e riva tio n  of 
th e  d o c tr in e , ra th e r  than  as ce n tra l to  i t .  H ow ever, i f  God is indeed 
p e rfe c t,  th is  v e ry  p e rfe c tio n  invo lves at least th e  rud im ents o f the  doc­
t r in e .
4.1  PERFECTION IMPLIES THREE-NESS
One comes back to  the  old a rgum ent o f the  v e s tig ia , as we perce ive  the  
fundam enta l n a tu re  o f re a lity  as p e rfe c t because God made i t ,  irre s p e c tiv e  
o f w h e th e r th e re  was a fa ll o r  n o t, and rem ark concern ing  the  threeness 
in th e  v e ry  fa b r ic  o f the  m a tte r, such as th e  3 dimensions and e lec trica l 
ch a rges (p ro to n , e lec tron  and n e u tro n ), o r  even the  fa c t th a t o n ly  a 
3 -le g g e d  ob ject (n o t 2 - ,  4 - ,  o r m ore) is in h e re n tly  s tab le . I t  is impossible 
fo r  us to  conceive a more p e rfe c t way o f do ing  th in g s . However,
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th re e -n e ss  is in h e re n t not ju s t in th e  crea tio n  as in the  " v e s t ig ia " ,  b u t 
in the  v e ry  fa b r ic  o f b e in g . I am not ju s t  seeking re fle c tio n s  o f th re e - 
ness b u t say ing  th a t th re e -n ess  its e lf  is p e rfe c t.
F undam enta lly , th e re  is a n a tu ra l fe e lin g  w ith in  us (p a r t ic u la r ly  from  a 
m a te ria lis tic  b a c k g ro u n d ) th a t b ig g e r is b e tte r ,  o r  more s p e c if ic a lly , th a t 
p lu ra li ty  is more p e rfe c t fo r  us than  simple s in g u la r ity .  To t r y  to  avoid 
simple m ateria lism ; as A u g u s tin e  im plied , i f  God is p e rfe c t, he m ust love 
p e r fe c t ly ,  and th is  means at the  v e ry  least d u a lity  (c f .  th e  quo ta tion  
made a b o ve), a lth ou g h  R ichard  of St V ic to r  d id  see th re e -n e s s  in th is  
aspect o f God. More re c e n tly  B a r t le tt ,  a rg u in g  from  th e  p e rfe c tio n  of 
God, says th a t th is  demands p e rs o n a lity  and p lu ra li ty  o f persons. 
Champion also s tresses th a t p e rs o n a lity  im plies p lu ra li ty  (a lth o u g h  he 
assumes G od's p e rs o n a lity  is like  o u rs ) .  Both are  re a lly  p ro p o n e n ts  of 
th e  social T r in i t y ;  God is in te rconscious (s e lf consciousness lead ing to  
s in ) ,  B a r t le tt  p o in tin g  o u t th a t in p e rfe c tio n  th e re  can be no b a rr ie rs  
to  u n ity  ( fo r  B a r t le tt  and Champion, c f.  Welch, 1953:9 7 f) .
These th in k e rs  are c o n tin u in g  to  emphasize, w ith  Anselm and A u g u s tin e , 
the  p r io r i ty  o f th e  idea o f re la tio n sh ip  in th in k in g  o f th e  T r in i t y .  I t  has 
been fre q u e n tly  po in te d  o u t th a t a s ing le  monad m ust be im p e rfe c t before  
crea tion  as h a v in g  n o th in g  w ith  w hich  to  have a re la tio n s h ip . The  idea 
o f th e  T r in i t y  f i l ls  th is  im perfec tion  by  enab ling  re la tio n s h ip  b e fo re  c re ­
a tio n , so th a t  God is not seen to  crea te  ju s t  to  f i l l  a need in H im self. 
W hether th is  needs th re e -n e s s  fo r  completeness is d o u b tfu l,  a lth ou g h  at 
least po ss ib le , ju s t  as th e  m arriage  re la tio n s h ip  is fu l f i l le d  w ith  a c h ild  
(w here  more th a n  one ch ild  makes no fundam ental d if fe re n c e ).
Moltmann (1981:33) m oreover says, " In  o rd e r  to  be com plete ly 
[p e r fe c t ly ]  i ts e lf ,  love has to  s u f fe r " .  T h is  o f course  leads us back to  
A u g u s tin e 's  d ic tu m  th a t i t  is b e tte r  ( i .e .  more p e rfe c t)  to  have fa llen  
and to  have been redeemed than  n e ve r to  have s inned  a t a ll. Now i f  th is  
is t ru e ,  th e  o ld  argum ents a ga inst Sabellianism , and in p a rt ic u la r  
P a tripassian ism , w ill le a d  us d ire c t ly  to  p lu ra li ty  in th e  G odhead. I t  is 
perhaps no acc id e n t th a t Anselm , the  o r ig in a to r  o f th e  O nto log ica l A r ­
gum ent, was also th e  a rc h ite c t o f the  commercial th e o ry  o f th e  atonem ent, 
w h ich  o f course  necessita tes p lu ra l i ty .  (T h e re  is pe rhaps a fu r th e r  con­
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nection  o f ideas in th a t the  O nto log ica l A rg u m e n t invo lves the  idea of 
in f in i t y ,  w hich is also p re se n t in th e  in f in ite  m e rit earned by  C h r is t. )
T h is  in its e lf m erely in genera l leads to  p lu ra li ty .  How ever, the  idea of 
th re e -n e ss  has always been associated w ith  p e rfe c tio n  and completeness. 
D e lling  (1972:216) notes th e  im portance o f the  num ber in the  ancient 
w o r ld : a th re e fo ld  re p e tit io n  makes an act d e f in it iv e .  For Ph ilo , th re e  is 
always p e rfe c t (D e llin g , 1972:217). B a rth  (1975:337) rem arks on its  im­
p o rtance  in n o n -C h ris tia n  re lig io n s , b u t feels th a t th is  is p ro b a b ly  due 
to  th e  th re e -fo ld e d n e ss  of the  human fa m ily . Hemer (1976:687) also notes 
th a t th re e  has w id e ly  been th o u g h t a sacred num ber, a lthough  he says 
th a t "s p e c ific a lly  re lig io u s  uses o f i t  in the  B ib le  seem to  be re la tiv e ly  
fe w " . On the  o th e r hand G unner (1982:844) says: "N um bers are also used 
[ in  th e  B ib le ] w ith  a sym bolic o r  theolog ica l s ig n ific a n c e ". A glance at a 
concordance ind icates th e  connection  o f th re e -n e s s  and p e rfe c tio n . To 
g ive  ju s t a few  examples: the  need o f 3 w itnesses (D e u t. 1 9 :15 ), 3 fe s ­
t iv a ls  a y e a r, th e  3 days ' jo u rn e y  in to  the  w ild e rn e ss  (E x . 3 :18) and 
p a r t ic u la r ly  th e  m u lt ip lic ity  o f occurrences o f 3 in th e  a rc h ite c tu re  o f the  
Tem ple. To th is  should p resum ab ly be added references to  7 (as 3*4 
(w h ich  also has connota tions o f p e rfe c tio n  in th e  sense of completeness 
fo r  obvious reasons (G u n n e r, 1982:8 4 5 ) ) ) , and to  12 (as 3 x 4 ). (I have 
d e lib e ra te ly  made prim e re fe rence  here  to  th e  O ld Testam ent, as th e re  
is a p o s s ib ility  th a t the  New Testam ent's n um ero logy, such as Paul's love 
o f tr ia d s  (eg . fa ith ,  hope, love) was in flue n ce d  by  some idea o f T r in i t y . )
I t  is , how ever, necessary to  move beyond B ib lica l examples as th e y  may 
sim ply re fle c t c u ltu re , a lthough  th e y  are re le v a n t in s o fa r as man, and 
in p a rt ic u la r  h is c u ltu re ,  re fle c ts  th e  n a tu re  o f God (G en. 1 :2 6 ). I t  is 
perhaps b e tte r  to  see the  p e rfe c tio n  o f these in n a tu ra l phenomena, such 
as the  th re e -le g g e d  stoo l, a lth ou g h  even th is  is suspect. The whole 
concept o f th e  ve s tig ia  is questionab le  in any case, b u t th e re  is a need 
to  move beyond sim ply seeing a pale re fle c tio n  o f God in a c rea tion  w hich 
is fa r  from  p e rfe c t. T he re  is a need to  move beyond th in g s  to  concepts 
w h ich  shou ld  be independen t o f a n y th in g  else; a lthough  i t  is hard  to  
v isu a lize  a w o rld  w ith o u t th e  in h e re n t th re e -n e ss  m entioned above. Thus 
a ttem pts to  communicate w ith  o th e r p lanets have re lied  on th e  most u n i­
ve rsa l o f languages, m athem atics. Here a case may be made o u t, te n ta ­
t iv e ly ,  fo r  the  g rea tness o f th re e , in th a t i t  takes 3 lines, a tr ia n g le  as
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the  minimum to  enclose a n y th in g  at a ll,  whereas a g re a te r  num ber o f sides 
adds n o th in g  b u t loses s im p lic ity . M oving to  th re e  d im ensions does not 
m a te ria lly  change the  p o s itio n . The sim plest f ig u re  now has fo u r  faces, 
each o f th re e  sides (g iv in g  the  seven and tw e lve  as a b o ve ). As a second 
exam ple, th e  motion o f a body at a p a rt ic u la r  tim e may be p e rfe c tly  de­
sc ribe d  in term s o f ju s t  th re e  param eters; speed, d ire c tio n  and mass. 
I t  has fu r th e r  param eters such as s p in , d is to r t io n ,  shape e tc . b u t these 
a re  not re le v a n t to  an o b s e rv e r. I t  is th re e , and th re e  alone, w hich is 
basic.
I f  mere num bers are cons idered , i t  is not necessary to  s im ply  tre a t  b ig g e r 
as b e tte r .  T h e re  is re a lly  no s ig n ific a n t d iffe re n c e  between tw o la rge  
num bers as th e y  tend  to  in f in i ty .  Aga in  th e y  loose s im p lic ity ,  w h ich  was 
one o f th e  a ttra c tio n s  th a t Judaism  and C h r is t ia n ity  had o v e r the  
po ly the ism  o f the  G reeks. More p a r t ic u la r ly ,  such log ic  is d e fe c tive  as 
i t  s u ffe rs  from  th in k in g  of p e rfe c tio n  on ly  in a q u a n tita t iv e  sense, th a t 
is , w ha t is p e rfe c t m ust have e v e ry th in g  (w h ich  is D escartes ' a rg u m e n t). 
To ta ke  re le v a n t examples; a p e rfe c t source and a p e rfe c t rece ive r are 
incom patib le , w h ich  is w hy God, as p e rfe c t, is b o th , b u t by  means o f a 
T r in i t y ;  a lso to  have p e rfe c t e xperience , God m ust be tra n s c e n d e n t and 
expe rie n ce  th e  c re a tio n , so become inca rn a te  again dem anding a T r in i ty .
4 .2  ONE AS PERFECT
The associa tion  o f u n ity  w ith  p e rfe c tio n  h a rd ly  needs to  be commented 
upon as i t  is so common. Hence o f the  major re lig io n s , Islam and Judaism , 
and to  some e x te n t H induism  and Buddhism  all emphasize "G od" as one. 
The  roo t o f th e  idea is of course th a t i f  th e re  are  tw o , then  th e y  m ust 
be d if fe r e n t ,  and i f  so one m ust be in fe r io r  to  a n o th e r. C o n ve rse ly , if 
one is in fe r io r ,  as A r iu s  claimed, th is  im m ediately d e s tro y s  th e  u n ity  of 
God. O n ly  one can be p e rfe c t. S im ila rly  Anselm  in his O nto log ica l A r ­
gum ent ave rs  th a t w hat is composed o f p a rts  cannot nece ssarily  e x is t 
(P la n tin g a , 1968:15). T hus the  e a rly  Fathers w ere  d r iv e n  to  declare  th a t 
re la tio n  was all th a t d is tin g u is h e d  the  persons o f th e  T r in i t y .  I t  is 
th e re fo re  a rg u a b le  th a t Anselm , fo r  exam ple, fo llo w in g  A u g u s tin e , is not
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g e n u in e ly  T r in ita r ia n .  By reduc ing  the  d iffe re n c e  between the  persons 
to  th a t o f re la tion  o n ly , th e y  are rea lly  no d if fe re n t from  simple 
m onothe ists. ( " In  God all th in g s  are one except w here th e re  is opposition  
o f re la tio n " (Anse lm , approved  by  the  C ouncil o f F lorence 1439, quoted 
in Welch 1953:109).)
Again speaking m athem atica lly, th e  u n it ,  one, has a ttr ib u te s  no g re a te r 
num ber has by  v ir tu e  o f its  s im p lic ity . I t  e x is ts , w hich th e  zero has 
tro u b le  do ing  ( th e  O nto log ica l A rgum ent is v is ib le  h e re ), b u t then is not 
re s tr ic te d  by  the  ex is tence  o f,  and th e re fo re  th e  need to  relate to , any 
o th e r , such as in m u ltip lica tio n  o r  d iv is io n .
4 .3  GOD AS THREE AND ONE
On the  one hand, th e re fo re , the  th re e -n e ss  o f God is seen as the  most 
p e rfe c t, b u t on the  o th e r, God's u n ity .  A t th e  f i r s t  g lance th is  seems 
to  be c o n tra d ic to ry . The answ er is ra th e r  from  the  p o in t o f pe rce p tio n . 
As seen above, God m ust be seen to  be p e rfe c t w ha tever p o in t o f view  
is adopted . I f  u n ity  is p re fe r re d , then  God is one, b u t i f  p lu ra li ty ,  then 
God is th re e . B u t God m ust be seen to  be th e  g re a te s t from  all p e r ­
spectives accord ing  to  the  O nto log ica l A rg u m e n t; hence God is both th re e  
and one. Moltmann (1981:148) again rem arks th a t in dea ling  w ith  the  
T r in i t y ,  an approva l "from  above" ( th a t  is from  a ph ilosoph ica l v ie w p o in t) 
a lways s ta rts  from  the  u n ity  o f God whereas an approach "from  below" 
( th a t is from  th e  B ib lica l p e rsp e c tive ) s ta rts  from  th reeness. So Hodgson 
rem arks th a t u n ity  comes from  reason and th e  Jew ish b a ckg ro u n d , t r in i t y  
from  reve la tion  (W elch, 1953:158).
T ra d itio n a l theo logy th u s  d is tin g u is h e s  between the  "P ersons" and the  
"Essence" to  m aintain both th re e -n e ss  and u n ity .
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4 .4  PERFECTION IMPLIES MOVEMENT
The o ld  G reek idea was th a t God m ust be im m utable, fo r ,  th e y  reasoned, 
any change m ust be from  p e rfe c t to  som ething d if fe r e n t ,  w h ich  m ust be 
less th a n  p e rfe c t. The consequences o f th a t idea fo r  e a rly  C h ris tia n  
th e o lo g y  are w ell know n, and have led to  an a p p re c ia tio n  th a t  im m u ta b ility  
is e xp ressed  not so much in the  negative  a t t r ib u te s  o f lim itlessness w h ich  
w ere  associated w ith  i t ,  b u t in th e  p o s itiv e  a t t r ib u te s  such as 
fa ith fu ln e s s , consis tency ( th a t is , again a s h if t  from  q u a n t ity  to  q u a lity ) .  
Indeed Moltmann (1981:45) u rg e s : " . . . t h e  lack o f a ny c re a tiv e  movement 
w ould  mean"an im perfection  in the  A b s o lu te ". Here he is th in k in g  o f the  
c rea tio n  o f men, b u t the  statem ent is e q u a lly  re le v a n t to  gen era tio n  and 
procession in the  Godhead. N everthe less, th e  idea o f p e rfe c tio n  d id  not 
exc lude  motion fo r  Plato and A r is to tle  (S on tag , 1962:100), as is c lea r la te r 
in th e  a rgum en ta tion  o f A qu inas. (H is fo u r th  way does no t suggest th a t 
God is an abso lu te , b u t is ra th e r  a v a ria n t o f th e  cosm ological a rgum en t. 
He is re fe r r in g  to  q u a n titie s  such as s ize, o r ,  s p e c if ic a lly ,  hea t, ra th e r  
than  q u a lity  (c f .  K enny, 1 9 6 9:8 1 ).) A qu inas here  sees th e  T r in i t y  in 
th e  tw o p o ss ib ilitie s  o f extension o f th e  s e lf, b y  w o rd  o r  b y  love . (T h a t 
is by  emotion and in te lle c t. Scotus says b y  n a tu re  and b y  w ill.  T h is  
d is tin c tio n  comes from  A r is to tle  (Fo rtm an , 1982: x x i ) . )  T h is  w il l ,  how ever, 
leads to  th re e  not tw o , as the  ex is tence  o f tw o p u re  e n titie s  im plies a 
t h i r d ,  th e  com bination (as p o s itive  and negative  m ust g iv e  r is e  to  a th i r d ,  
th e  n e u tra l) .  Hence we ge t th re e  actions in G od, those  o f c rea tion  
(w o rd ) ,  s p ira tio n  (love ) and genera tion  (w o rd  and lo v e ). T h e re  is o f 
course  a re fle c tio n  o f A u g u s tin e  here.
I t  w ill also be c lear th a t p e rfe c tio n  w ill in v o lv e  th e  " f i l io q u e " ,  as com­
ple teness re q u ire s  th re e  s ta tes , th a t o f to ta l g iv in g  ( th e  F a th e r) to ta l 
re c e iv in g  (th e  S p ir it )  and both g iv in g  and re c e iv in g  ( th e  S on). Moltmann 
(1981) tr ie s  to  d e riv e  a m u lt ip lic ity  o f o rd e r in g  o f persons (F -S -H S , 
H S -F -S  e tc ) b u t th is  w ill tend  to  d e s tro y  th e  in h e re n t re la tio n s , and th u s  
th e ir  p e rfe c tio n .
I t  is in te re s tin g  to  note th a t Hodgson, w r it in g  fro m  a m odern v ie w p o in t, 
and th u s  in flue n ce d  by  e v o lu tio n a ry  re la tiv is m , denies th e  ex is tence  of
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genera tion  and s p ira tio n  and also th u s  o f the  " f ilio q u e "  problem 
(H odgson, 1943:102 e tc ).
4 .5  PERFECTION IMPLIES ETER N ITY
For th e  ancients th is  was ob v io us , so A r iu s  th in k in g  of the  Son (so 
ha v in g  an o r ig in )  im mediately conceived o f him as im pe rfe c t, so s u b o r­
d in a te . S im ila rly  A u g u s tin e , who fe lt  th a t God m ust be im m utable, o r He 
cou ld  not be p e rfe c t (S ontag , 1962:37). What is d es ired  is to  avoid any 
idea th a t God could at all be lim ite d , in th is  sense b y  tim e. A lthough  it  
has been fe l t  th a t God in some way is ou ts ide  tim e, as his s p ir itu a l n a tu re  
means th a t he transcends space, o u r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f time does not in 
fa c t see th is  as a p o s s ib ility . Time as such does not e x is t, b u t is a way 
in w hich  change is noted. I t  is not a th in g  w hich  may be transcended , 
b u t the  idea of e te rn ity  means th a t i t  may be encompassed.
4 .6  PERFECTION IMPLIES MOVEMENT AND ETER N ITY
J u s t as God as g re a te r  than  all m ust be a t th e  same time th re e  and one, 
so God m ust be m oving and e te rn a l, tw o ideas w h ich  seem on th e  surface  
e q u a lly  c o n tra d ic to ry , b u t again depend on th e  p o in t o f view  of the  o b ­
s e rv e r . To be g re a te r th a t a ll,  God m ust be s ta tic  and u n chang ing ; b u t 
to  be g re a te r  than  a ll,  God m ust be dynam ic and m oving . These tw o are 
combined in th e  th o u g h t o f O rig e n , w ho, in o rd e r to  exclude any idea 
o f change in th e  Godhead, s ta ted  the  notion  o f e te rna l g e n era tio n . (He 
also app lied  th is  to  his ideas o f c rea tion  w ith  less fo rtu n a te  re s u lts .)  
A lth o u g h  O rigen  tended to  be s u b o rd in a tio n is t in his th e o lo g y , tow ards 
th e  end o f the  A ria n  c o n tro v e rs y  th e  idea o f e te rn a l genera tion  (and by 
log ical e x te ns io n , e te rna l p ro ce ss io n ), was seen as a way o f re ta in in g  the  
ideas o f sonship w ith o u t im p ly in g  s u b o rd in a tio n . T hus th e  idea of an 
e te rn a l process is a way o f s y n th e s iz in g  tw o a p p a re n tly  c o n tra d ic to ry  
ideas.
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5 . CONCLUSION
I t  is my c o n te n tio n , th e re fo re , th a t i f  th e  idea o f God as p e rfe c t is re ­
ta in ed  in th e o lo g y , th is  does lead lo g ica lly  to  th e  essentia l elements o f 
T r in ita r ia n  d o c tr in e . W hether th is  w ould be so c le a r i f  we d id  not know 
w ha t we w ere aim ing at is a n o th e r m a tte r; Schopenhauer tre a te d  the  
O nto log ica l A rg u m e n t its e lf as a b it  o f a joke  (P la n tin g a , 1968:v i i )  a lb e it 
a "c h a rm in g "  one, because he saw exis tence  in tro d u c e d  as one o f the  
prem ises o f th e  A rgum en t (P la n tin g a , 1968:65). ( In  th e  same way Spinoza 
d e fine d  God as one who necessarily  e x is ts  (P la n tin g a , 19 6 8 :7 0 ).)
Perhaps, h ow ever, th e  last w ord  should be g iv e n  to  Thomas a Kempis, 
(F ra n k s , 1953:1) who spoke from  a conception  o f God as p e rfe c t: "What 
w ill i t  ava il thee to  a rgue  p ro fo u n d ly  o f the  T r in i t y ,  if  thou  be vo id  of 
h u m ility  and are th e re b y  d isp leas ing  to  the  T r in ity ?
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